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Prepayment of Intangible Drilling Costs: Before and
After the Deficit Reduction Act
Hilary G. Lynch*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the extent to which prepayments of Intangible Drilling Costs (IDC) are currently deductible in the year of
prepayment by cash basis taxpayers. A message, however, inevitably emanates from the discussion, a message which, though hardly
novel, deserves emphasis. The message is that our tax law has become intolerably prolix, abstruse and complex.
The question here considered is a simple one. It arises in the
context of raising private capital for the development of domestic
oil and gas resources and is, therefore, also an important one. The
simple question should have a simple, non-esoteric answer. It does
not. Although the Tax Court quite recently attempted to establish
some definite guidelines in Stephen A. Keller,' the effort has not
been entirely successful and the case law remains unclear. The position of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as reflected in its rulings, acquiescences and arguments in litigation is vacillating and
inconsistent. Finally, although Congress specifically addressed certain aspects of our issue in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DRA), the new statutory provisions are a feckless elaboration.
They confuse more than clarify.
Regrettably, this IDC imbroglio is not atypical. It is but one example drawn from an overwhelming host. To borrow a felicitous
phrase from the poet, Blake, our tax law has grown to a "burdensome corpulence." Even experts can no longer confidently cope.
II.

NATURE OF THE ISSUE

Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 263(c) permits taxpayers
who invest in oil and gas drilling ventures to deduct "intangible
* The author is a partner in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania law firm of Rose, Schmidt,
Chapman, Duff & Hasley.
1. 79 T.C. 7 (1982).
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drilling costs." In general, these costs include virtually all of the
expenses of drilling an oil or gas well except those items which
have a salvage value. Typically, these costs include wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, and other costs which are usually incurred in the
drilling, shooting and cleaning of wells.2 In the Appalachian region,
these costs run from between sixty percent to eighty percent of the
taxpayer's investment in the drilling program.
The IDC is not the sole tax advantage of an oil or gas investment. The investor may claim the investment tax credit on the
hardware used in the project such as derricks, drilling equipment,
pumps, base and drill equipment and special purpose housing
structures. Further, independent producers are entitled to a "depletion" allowance of fifteen percent on income distributed from
the program.
The deduction for intangible drilling costs, however, is the main
"tax shelter" incentive for an oil or gas investment. For example, if
a taxpayer invests $30,000 in an oil partnership and seventy percent of his investment goes toward intangible drilling costs, the
taxpayer is entitled to deduct $21,000. This deduction is very solid
because Congress clearly conferred it to stimulate and encourage
the domestic production of oil and gas.3
The major question with respect to the IDC deduction is not its
allowability, but, rather, its timing. When is the deduction
allowable?
One would suppose that for cash basis taxpayers the deduction
would be allowable when and as the expenses are actually paid out.
Hence, if a cash basis taxpayer invests in a drilling partnership
early in a particular tax year and all the wells contemplated by the
partnership are in fact drilled by the end of that year, the taxpayer
would be entitled to claim the full amount of the intangible drilling costs as a deduction for that year. On the other hand, if some
of the intangible drilling costs are actually paid in one year and the
balance in a succeeding year, one would suppose that the deduction is prorated over the two years. The law comports with these
suppositions where the taxpayer pays the expenses as they are
incurred.
However, what if the taxpayer makes his total investment in December of 1983, but the wells are not drilled and completed until
2. For a history, see Bernuth v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 225, 234-35 (1971), afJ'd, 470
F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972).
3. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597 (1984).
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March of 1984? In this case the taxpayer has completely parted
with his cash in 1983. Can he claim his total "prepayment" as a
deduction for the year 1983 or must he wait until 1984 when the
expenses are actually incurred?
For an individual or business entity who or which is constantly
engaged in the business of drilling oil and gas wells, the current
deductibility vel. non of a prepayment would not normally be a
matter of great moment. Over time and in the end the taxpayer
will get his fair share of deductions.
During the past twenty years, however, an increasing number of
drilling programs have been financed not by individuals and companies regularly engaged in the oil and gas business, but, rather, by
members of the general investing public. Limited partnership syndications are put together by promoters. The limited partnership
units are marketed to any individual who can meet the applicable
securities law suitability standards. Some of these syndications,
such as those sponsored by King Resources, Petro-Lewis and Damson, are large programs, registered under the Federal securities
laws and sold throughout the nation. Many others are limited partnerships with only twenty five or thirty investors and are marketed
pursuant to private offering exemptions.
To the passive investor in a limited partnership syndication, the
availability of a current deduction for his unit purchase is often
the sine qua non of his investment. Panicked by the prospect of a
large tax bill for a particular calendar year, the investor runs to his
broker at year end to buy a tax shelter. The investor pays $30,000
cash into an oil partnership on December 31 of the year in reliance
upon the supposition that he can deduct seventy percent or more
of that $30,000 for that calendar year, not for the next one. The
offering memorandum discloses that the partnership will not drill
and complete its wells until the following year.
In these cases, which are now rife, the issue of the full current
deductibility of the prepayment is diacritically important.

III. PRE-DRA
A.

HISTORY

Pauley v. United States

The prepayment issue was first officially addressed in Revenue
Ruling 53-170:
Advice is requested whether intangible drilling and development costs
prepaid by a taxpayer, who keeps his accounts and files his returns on the
cash basis and elects to treat such costs as expense, constitute an allowable
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deduction for the year in which payment was made or for the year in which
the drilling and development services were actually rendered."

The facts underlying the ruling were those of Pauley v. United
States,5 and are summarized immediately below in our discussion
of that seminal case. The ruling held that the prepayment of expenses was not deductible in the year of prepayment; the expenses
were, of course, deductible in the following year when the drilling
was performed.
Barbara Jean and Edwin W. Pauley were the objects of this Ruling and were not at all pleased with the result. They paid the taxes
assessed, filed a refund claim and, when the claim was denied, sued
for a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California.
The operative facts were as follows. Mr. Pauley was an individual engaged in the oil producing business who kept his books on
the cash basis. During the year 1947 Mr. Pauley, both by himself
and through various agents, identified a potential drilling site and
negotiated a lease for that site of $5,000. On October 31, 1947,
Pauley wrote to eight or ten drilling contractors requesting bids for
drilling the identified well. On November 10, 1947, Pauley entered
into an oral drilling contract with Pike Drilling Company (Pike).
Pike was short of cash, the drilling business was highly competitive at the time and Pike was concerned about Pauley's capacity to
pay. As a result of bona fide negotiations, it was agreed that
Pauley would make an initial payment on the drilling contract of
$95,000. During November and December some preliminary work
on the well site was commenced, a bond was secured and permits
were applied for. Pauley's application for a drilling permit was not
approved until December 30, 1947.
On December 31, 1947 a formal drilling agreement embodying all
the terms and conditions of the oral contract of November 10, 1947
was executed by Pauley and Pike. On the same day Pauley made
the agreed upon payment of $95,000. The contract was not turnkey.6 Drilling commenced on January 5, 1948, the well was spudded on January 13, 1948 and was drilled to a successful completion
depth of 8,430 feet by March 12, 1948. Mr. Pauley claimed the
$95,000 prepayment as a deduction for intangible drilling and development costs for the year 1947.
4. 1953-2 C.B. 141.
5. 63-1 U.S.T.C. 9280 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1963).
6. Turnkey contracts are drilling contracts for a fixed price.
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As noted above, the Internal Revenue Service ruled against the
taxpayers. The ruling rationale was that Pauley's prepayment was
with respect to a contract for personal services to be performed in
the future and no expenses were actually incurred until 1948. Ergo,
no deductions for IDC were allowable until 1948.
The district court held for the plaintiffs in their refund suit and
expressly refused to follow Revenue Ruling 53-170. Among the
court's findings of fact were the following:
The evidence clearly shows that the Pike Drilling Company required a
prepayment of the intangible drilling expenses. The evidence also clearly
shows that it was natural and reasonable business practice for the plaintiffs
to have formally executed the contract with Pike Drilling Company and to
have made the prepayment of expenses on December 31, 1947. The record
indicates that it was not until December 30, 1947, that the Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors approved plaintiff Pauley's application for a
drilling permit. The record further indicates that late in the year 1947 complicated and diverse negotiations between plaintiffs and governmental agencies, contractors and lessors were still continuing. Finally, the record shows
that work began immediately after December 31, 1947, pursuant to the Pike
Drilling Company contract with plaintiffs, and 7 continued without any substantial delay until the completion of the well.

The court concluded, inter alia, that the prepayment of the intangible drilling expenses was both an "ordinary" and a "necessary" expense, under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code and was
fully deductible in the year of payment. The court also appropriately held that the contract was not for personal services but
rather was for intangible drilling and development costs.
Of comfort to those tax advisers who tend to be intimidated by
IRS rulings was the following additional conclusion of law:
Revenue Ruling 170, . . . the facts of which have been taken from the
case at bar, is not binding on the Court and will not be followed. Administrative rulings cannot preempt the functions of the Court. Even if the foregoing Ruling was not taken from the facts of this case, it would have no
more binding or legal force than would the opinion of any other lawyer.'

In sportsmanlike manner, though a bit tardily, the IRS followed
Pauley and revoked Revenue Ruling 53-170. The demarche was
announced in Revenue Ruling 71-252. 9 The basic Pauley facts were
reiterated. The dates were different, different aspects of the total
factual situation were highlighted, but Pauley was the obvious
7. 63-1 U.S.T.C. at 87,656.
8. Id. at 87,657.
9. 1971-1 C.B. 146.
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focus.
Citing Pauley, Revenue Ruling 71-252 holds: "The circumstances described in the instant case show that the taxpayer as a
result of a bonafide transaction was obligated to pay the amounts
of intangible drilling and development costs at the time specified
in the drilling contract,"1 0
Though a victory for the taxpayer, Pauley (and the subsequent
concession by the IRS) was surely not a safe harbor for attorneys
writing tax opinions on typical oil and gas syndications. The
Pauley decision was clearly grounded on the particular facts there
involved: the fact that the well site had been identified, the fact
that substantial work had been performed in the year of prepayment, the fact that drilling was expeditiously completed in the
year following the prepayment, and, most importantly, the fact
that prepayment was negotiated for a business reason. (Pike
needed cash, did not know to what degree Pauley was financially
strong, and therefore demanded a heavy downpayment.)
Unlike Pauley, the passive investors in a syndication are not
generally engaged in or even familiar with the oil business. At the
outset these investors are as interested in the tax deductions which
they can claim as they are in the productivity of the wells. The
syndications are frequently organized and sold at the end of the
calendar year for the simple reason that the investing public tends
to be very tax conscious at that time. Superficially, it would appear
that the prepayments claimed by these year end syndications,
which deductions are passed through to the investors, are primarily claimed to secure current tax benefits for those investors and do
not reflect business negotiations between the investors and the
driller.
Still another distinguishing factor deserves mention here. The
Pike Drilling Company was totally unrelated to Mr. Pauley. In
syndicated deals the drilling contractors are often affiliates of the
promoter general partners. Thus, there are the additional questions of (a) whether the partnership has irrevocably committed its
money by the end of the tax year when such money has been paid
to a controlled entity and (b) whether there can be a meaningful
business negotiation between controlled entities.
Therefore, throughout the 1970's, it was difficult to give a strong
tax opinion concerning prepayment where the investors had committed their monies at near year end and there was no realistic
10.

Id. at 147.
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possibility of the wells being completed within the calendar year of
investment. The Pauley facts were just too far afield.
The practitioner's concern with prepayments in standard syndicated deals proved not to be chimerical. Revenue Ruling 80-7111
zeroed in on such a deal.
The facts were as follows. Corporation X was the General Partner in a limited partnership organized in 1975 for the purpose of
developing oil and gas properties. X signed a contract with corporation Y, the "parent" of X, pursuant to which Y was to drill certain specified wells for the partnership. For all wells the agreement
required that fixed price payments be made to Y on or before December 31, 1975. If a specified well was drilled and abandoned
without completion, the difference between the price paid on December 31, 1975 and the fixed price paid for drilling without completion was to be credited toward the cost of drilling another well
or wells to be designated in the future.
The contract did not say when Y was to start drilling. Y owned
no drilling equipment and intended to sub-contract to independent
drillers pursuant to conventional footage and day work agreements. Under these contracts the drillers were not entitled to payment from Y until performance was completed.
The ruling held that X's December 31, 1975 prepayment to Y
was not deductible by the partnership until 1976. The IRS, quite
properly, pointed out that its prior Revenue Ruling 71-252 was
based on the Pauley facts and that those facts were distinguishable
because they "evidenced a bona fide, arm's length transaction entered into for a valid business purpose
. 12 In the instant ruling the payments to Y "were not made in accordance with customary business practice."'" On the contrary, the expenditures "were
prompted by the federal income tax advantages that resulted from
the deduction."1 " Under section 446(b) the expenses had to be allocated to the year 1976 in order to clearly reflect income.
It is difficult to find fault with Revenue Ruling 80-71. There
seems to have been no business purpose whatsoever for the prepayment there.
11. 1980-1 C.B. 106.
12. Id. at 107.
13. Id. at 108.
14. Id.
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B. Dillingham v. United States
But, then came Dillingham v. United States.15 With interesting
insight the Dillingham court found a business purpose in a related
party prepayment transaction.
The opinion also focuses on the unique nature of the "turnkey"
contract. Turnkey contracts are drilling contracts for a fixed price.
In other words, these contracts lock in the drilling price as of the
time they are executed. Neither Pauley nor any of the Revenue
Rulings discussed above involved such contracts.
The Dillingham facts were these. Basin Petroleum Corporation
was primarily engaged in the business of contract drilling for oil
and gas wells. Basin ran into financial difficulties in the year 1970
because of a large cost overrun in drilling a well that year. In order
to "beef up" its cash flow Basin decided to get into the syndication
as well as the drilling business. Basin, as general partner, formed
investment partnerships. These partnerships then contracted with
Basin, as driller, under turnkey contract arrangements. The prepayments made by the investor partnerships on the turnkey contracts were disallowed by the IRS. Dillingham, one of the investor
partners, paid his tax and sued for a refund.
The case for the IRS would appear to have been very strong
here. Basin was, in effect, contracting with Basin and, therefore,
the taxpayers would find it very difficult to sustain an argument
that the contracts were negotiated in the sense of the Pauley case.
Furthermore, the IRS could certainly argue that the investment
partnerships never really relinquished control of the money because it, as a practical matter, remained with Basin after the
payment.
The court, however, found business purpose here and, as so frequently happens, business purpose carried the day:
A principal reason for the prepayment requirement was to provide Basin
with working capital for the drilling of wells and to temporarily provide
funds to Basin for other operations. This was a legitimate business arrangement and not merely a sham to permit the deduction of I.D.C.'s in a particular year. 6

The court repeated this finding of fact in its conclusions of law:
The fact that the owner and contractor is the general partner of the partnership-owner does not change this result where, as here, the Plaintiffs have
shown that prepayment was required for a legitimate business purpose and
15. 81-2 U.S.T.C.
16. Id. at 88,012.

9601 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
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the transaction was not a sham to merely permit plaintiff to control the
timing of the deduction."

The court also pointed out that the contracts under consideration were "turnkey". Once Basin, as contractor, had signed the
turnkey contract and had been paid the fixed price, Basin, as drilling contractor, was duty bound to complete the specified wells for
the price paid. The cost of overruns could not be passed back to
the investor partnerships.
In this case, although the contract which requires prepayment is between
related parties, the Court finds that the contract is an enforceable contract
of economic substance which Basin had a fiduciary duty as well as contractual duty to perform. The investor was assured of a turnkey price. Prepayment is the usual practice on turnkey contracts. Basin received working
capital. At the same time, Basin was required to drill the wells within a
reasonable time.' 8

Since many drilling contractors entered the syndication business
for the very reasons that Basin did, the Dillingham case provided
some additional comfort to tax opinion writers dealing with similar
circumstances. Just as frequently, on the other hand, investment
promoters developed affiliations with drilling contractors to
"sweeten up" their promotions. One questions whether the Dillingham result would have been the same if the shoe had been on the
other foot, i.e., if Basin Petroleum had been an investment banker
which went into the drilling business in order to increase its investment banking profits.
C.

Stephen A. Keller

The turnkey contract proved to be the lynchpin of the subsequent decision in Stephen A. Keller.1 9
The Keller case involved standard syndicated deals. The investor partnerships made prepayments on two different types of contracts. One form of contract was the "turnkey" agreement discussed in Dillingham. The second type of contract was the socalled "footage and day work contract". Under this second form of
contract, charges by the contractor are made as work is performed.
Thus, the total price is not determined until the actual work has
finally been completed.
The Commissioner contended that the year end prepayments
17. Id. at 88,013.
18. Id. at 88,014.
19. 79 T.C. 7 (1982).
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under both types of contracts were not deductible in the year of
payment. His fundamental argument was not directly based on either of the prior rulings discussed above. Rather, he tracked the
three-part test for current deductibility of prepaid amounts articulated in Revenue Ruling 75-152,1° which dealt with prepaid cattle
feed, not with intangible drilling costs. Under the ruling a prepayment is only currently deductible if (a) the expenditure is truly a
payment and not a mere deposit, (b) the payment is for a business
purpose, and not for tax avoidance, and (c) the current deduction
does not result in a material distortion of income. In the Commissioner's opinion, none of the prepayments contested in Keller met
all of these tests.
The taxpayer argued, on the other hand, that the prepayments
on both types of contracts were made for business purposes and
fell within the protection of Pauley. The taxpayer also argued that
section 263(c) evinced a congressional intent to allow a current deduction for intangible drilling costs and that section 263(c) "overrides" section 446(b) insofar as drilling costs are concerned.
The majority of the Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner
that the case should be analyzed under Revenue Ruling 75-152,
but with one important modification. The court had previously
held in Commissioner v. Van Raden,2 1 a cattle feed case, that although the criteria of Revenue Ruling 75-152 were generally valid,
"a substantial legitimate business purpose satisfie[d] the distortion
of income test."2 2 In other words, if the prepayment passed the
.deposit test and got very high marks on the business purpose test,
it did not have to sit for the third exam. The Keller court applied
the ruling as so modified by Van Raden.
The footage and day work contracts flunked badly. These contracts provided for refunds to the partnership under a variety of
circumstances. Hence, the prepayments were really just "deposits."
Secondly, the petitioners produced no evidence that the prepayments were actually negotiated or served any business purpose. Finally, the prepayments resulted in a material distortion of income.
The Tax Court properly distinguished Pauley and Dillingham
on the basis that those cases clearly involved prepayments for a
business purpose.
With respect to the petitioner's second contention concerning
20.
21.
22.

1975-1 C.B. 144.
71 T.C. 1083 (1979), aff'd, 650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1106.
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the footage and day work contracts, i.e., that section 263(c) overrides section 446(b), the court states:
Petitioners argue that Congress specifically allowed the distortion implicit
in accelerating the deduction of these capital items by giving taxpayers the
option to expense them. But Congress did not specify ad arbitrium that
taxpayers could take the IDC deduction when paid, or mandate that prepaid IDC are immune from the general tax accounting rules relating to the
timing of expense deductions.23

The turnkey contracts fared better. On the facts presented, the
court concluded that the contracts did not contain unilateral refund provisions and, hence, the prepayments were true payments.
Secondly, since these contracts locked-in drilling costs, they served
a business purpose.
The remaining question is whether taking a 1973 deduction for amounts
paid in 1973 on turnkey contracts materially distorts the drilling partnership's income. We find that such amounts clearly reflect income and thus
are deductible in 1973.
We base this conclusion on the unique characteristics of the turnkey contract. An owner pays a significant premium to a driller to get a turnkey
obligation as contrasted with a footage and daywork contract. The turnkey
contract obligates the driller to drill to the contract depth for a stated price,
regardless of the time, materials, or expenses required to drill the well. The
turnkey contract thus locks in prices. It also shifts the drilling risks from
the owner to the driller. By signing and paying the turnkey obligation, the
drilling partnership knew that, as far as it was concerned, the well was
drilled. Therefore, we find that the partnership effectively got its bargained
for benefit in the year of payment. Accordingly, cash basis taxpayers, like
the drilling partnership, properly may deduct turnkey payments in the
24
year of payment.

The majority opinion is thorough, extensive and seems reasonable enough. Very significantly, the court gives taxpayers a clean
and coherent guideline to follow: the text of Revenue Ruling 75152, as modified by Van Raden. Although only turnkey-type contracts are surely sanctioned, the door is left open for Pauley-type
cases.
Justice Tannenwald filed a short concurring opinion which emphasizes that the court's holding with respect to IDC personal services is limited to the Keller facts. Justices Irwin and Whitaker
joined in this opinion.
Justice Goffe filed a concurring and dissenting opinion with
which Justices Dawson, Wiles and Korner agreed. The gist of the
23. Keller, 79 T.C. at 39.
24. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
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dissent from an academic standpoint is first that the IRS and
hence the court had no justification for applying Revenue Ruling
75-152 to IDC prepayments. The cattle feed business and the oil
business have little in common. Secondly, Congress clearly intended section 263(c) to permit the current deduction of intangible
drilling costs.
The dissent is convincing, more so in the author's view than the
majority's analysis. Relying upon the strength of Justice Goffe's
opinion, Keller appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the Tax
Court majority.2 5
The circuit court's opinion is careful and dutifully grounded on
the "clearly erroneous" standards. It has a distinct air of finality.
With notable insight the court, inter alia, opines that the congressional intent which the taxpayer saw in section 263(c) and to which
Justice Goffe referred in his dissent, simply was not there. If current prepayment deductions were to be allowed in virtually all
cases, the court observes: "Taxpayers would reap an immediate tax
benefit while the drilling that Congress sought to spur might not
'
be commenced for years. 26
This was implied in Pauley and, practically speaking, is probably a correct inference.
D. Post-Keller Decisions
While the Keller case was on appeal to the Eight Circuit, the
2 7 Ruth involved turnkey
Tax Court decided Ruth v. Commissioner.
contracts only and the court held for the taxpayer, explicitly following the Keller Tax Court decision. The quote from the Keller
Tax Court opinion cited above was repeated in the Ruth opinion.
Notably, the prepayment in Ruth was to a controlled entity, but
the IRS evidently did not argue this point. The issue was not
addressed.

Keller was followed again in Jolley v. Commissioner, a decision
made on February 13, 1984, just twelve days after Keller had been
affirmed by the circuit court. Jolley contains some significant wrinkles. First, the turnkey contracts again were made with a related
party and this time the IRS specifically argued that Revenue Ruling 80-71 was applicable. The court held that the fact that the par25.
26.
27.
28.

Keller v. Commissioner, 725 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1179.
46 T.C.M. 1484 (1983).
47 T.C.M. 1082 (1984).
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ties were related was immaterial, citing Keller and Dillingham.
Secondly, the prepayments, as in Revenue Ruling 80-71, were to an
entity which owned no drilling equipment and subcontracted the
drilling to other parties on a footage and daywork basis. The court
found no problem with this. Thirdly, Jolley clearly indicated that
a prepayment made pursuant to a turnkey contract is per se for a
business purpose.2 9 Finally, the court expressly applied the test applied in Keller, although the test is labeled "two part" rather than
"three part."
In 1984-17, I.R.B. 5, the Commissioner acquiesced in the Keller
Tax Court decision. It seemed that, as of the spring of 1984 Keller
was a sure guideline. Not so.
The cited IRS acquiesence was limited to "result" and was only
to apply to cases where prepayment was made to "independent
third parties." ("Acquiesence 'in result' means acceptance of the
result but disagreement with some or all of the reasons assigned
for the decision.")
Furthermore, the IRS chose to appeal both the Ruth and Jolley
decisions and those appeals remain pending as of the date this article was written. These appeals plainly signify disagreement with
the Keller holding and implicitly evidence an intent to create a
conflict in the circuits and consequent petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
The clarifying momentum of Keller and its progeny was also
contemporaneously thwarted by the Tax Court's decision in Levy
v. Commissioner.0 Levy excited much comment on the question of
whether promissory notes constitute payments, but little comment
on the prepayment issue even though this issue is squarely addressed. Levy held on July 26, 1982, just sixteen days after the Tax
Court's opinions in Keller were filed, that a prepayment on a turnkey contract was currently deductible despite the fact that the
contract did not require payment until the drilling was completed. Prepayment was not bargained for; it was volunteered. The
general partner and the driller parties were unquestionably related. The court nevertheless found that the prepayments were
made for a business purpose. The explicit rationale for this conclusion is that substantial work had been performed in the year of
prepayment. Pauley and Revenue Ruling 71-252 give credence to
this factor; but in neither authority is this factor determinative.
29. Id. at 1086 & n.4.
30. 44 T.C.M. 575 (1982).
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Although Levy cites Keller and Van Raden, the Revenue Ruling
75-152 test is not applied.
In view of the Ruth and Jolley decisions, Levy could have, in the
spring of 1984, been disregarded as a "sport" case, a mutation.
However, both the taxpayer and the IRS appealed the case and on
May 8, 1984, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax
Court. "
The Ninth Circuit, in accord with the Eighth, opines that section
263(c) does not create an optional accounting rule. Section 263(c)
permits taxpayers to expense items which would otherwise be capitalized, but it does not say that those expenses are in all cases deductible when paid. The circuit court accepted the Tax Court's
finding that the prepayments were for a "business purpose." None
of the cases or rulings discussed above are cited by the court in a
relevant context. Pauley, Dillingham, Keller and the Van Raden
test seem to have played no major role in this decision.
As of May 8, 1984, it was difficult, if not impossible, to find a
reliable thread of consistency in the cases. Pauley held that a prepayment is valid where an independent driller demands it and
where some work is done in the prepayment year, even though the
contract is not turnkey. Dillingham held that a prepayment is
valid where a related party driller contracts for it under a turnkey
contract, because the driller needs the up front money. Keller held
that a prepayment is valid where a turnkey contract calls for it and
the Revenue Ruling 75-152 tests are met; otherwise it is not. Levy
held that a prepayment under a turnkey contract is good if substantial work is done in the prepayment year even if the turnkey
contract does not require prepayment.
We concede that certain inferences could be made: (a) taxpayers
who fall within the compass of Pauley would prevail; (b) taxpayers
whose prepayments are made pursuant to turnkey contracts requiring prepayments containing no unilateral refund feature would
probably prevail; (c) taxpayers might prevail if substantial work is
performed in the year of prepayment even though the turnkey contract does not require prepayment; (d) the fact that prepayment is
made to a related party probably makes no difference.
These inferences, however, were definitely attenuated by the
IRS appeals in Jolley and Ruth and the limited nature of the acquiesence by the IRS in Keller.
All such inferences, in addition, could only be tentatively posited
31.

Levy v. Commissioner, 732 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
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because of the prospect of new legislation which was on the drawing boards. In early March, 1984, Congress began to consider the
concept of "economic performance," a new concept with respect to
cash basis taxpayers but one which potentially affected IDC prepayments. Oil and gas prepayments were not mentioned in the
March and April preliminary congressional reports, nor in the proposed statutory modifications. However, IDC prepayments were
conceptually encompassed and hence tax practitioners were
paralyzed.
On the other hand, practitioners had every reason to believe that
Congress would take a firm and clear stance on our issue in its final
legislation. The legitimate expectation was that all doubts would
be resolved.
The doubts were not resolved.
IV.

DRA

In amending the Internal Revenue Code to add sections 461(h)
and 461(i), DRA introduced a new concept to be applied in the
prepayment area. Generally, if services or property are furnished
to a taxpayer, the taxpayer cannot deduct his costs for such services or property until "economic performance occurs. '32 Where
the taxpayer is a cash basis "tax shelter" as defined in the new
provisions, special statutory rules concerning "economic performance" are imposed. For reasons which are discussed below, the
typical oil and gas partnership is a tax shelter for purposes of section 461(i).
The first rule is that cash basis taxpayers cannot deduct any
34
item earlier than the time when economic performance occurs.
There is, however, an exception to this rule: items may be deducted to the extent of "cash basis" where economic performance
35
occurs within ninety days after the close of the taxable year.
Skipping for the moment the question of what is meant by "cash
basis," we pass on to the next major rule which is specifically applicable to oil and gas drilling. This rule is that economic performance occurs for purposes of the ninety-day exception when "the
drilling of the well is commenced. '36 Since the cited subsection is
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§
§
§
§
§

461(h).
461(i).
461(i)(1).
461(i)(2)(A).
461(i)(2)(D).

1006

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:991

headed "Special Cash Basis Rule for Spudding of Oil or Gas
Wells," one assumes that drilling is commenced when the well is
"spudded". The term "spudded" is not defined. In the argot of the
industry, however, a well is "spudded" when the surface casing is
set and preliminary drilling to roughly thirty feet has taken place.
Facially, the statute seems to say that any year end prepayment
of IDC is currently deductible if the contemplated wells are spudded within ninety days after the close of the year. There is no clear
indication that a distinction is to be drawn between turnkey and
footage and day work contracts or that any other prior law tests
must be met.
The conference report, however, totally negatives this reasonable
inference and thereby a trap for the unwary is set. After reviewing
the statutory changes made, the relevant report says that any IDC
prepayment must "not be a deposit, that it be for a business purpose, and that it not result in a material distortion of income." It
recites that these criteria are "limitations of present law."
The report does not refer to Keller or to Revenue Ruling 75-152,
although references to current cases and rulings are common in
many other sections of the report. Consequently, it is completely
unclear as to whether the recited criteria of Revenue Ruling 75-152
are being adopted as stated or whether that ruling as modified by
Keller and Van Raden is being sanctioned. We assume the latter.
However, a simple reference to Keller would have eliminated the
question. Had Congress really known what it was doing, such a reference surely would have been made. The report implies that the
"current" law "limitations" were long standing and generally accepted, whereas, in fact, there is now and always has been a question as to what the law is.
In summary, if the statute is read without reference to the conference report, it can be reasonably construed as having overruled
the Keller holding on footage and day work contracts. The conference report, on the other hand, can be interpreted as completely
sanctioning the position of the IRS in Keller, i.e., that the criteria
of Revenue Ruling 75-152 should be literally applied in toto, and
thereby evidences a congressional intent to overrule the Keller
court's holding on turnkey contracts. This ambivalence is
depressing.
Viewed in isolation, the ninety day rule is less depressing. The
taxpayer gets the current deduction if the wells are spudded within
ninety days after the close of the tax year. Assuming the IRS does
not contest the normal commercial meaning of "spudded," compli-
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ance with this requirement should not be unduly difficult and is
generally consistent with prior law. An expeditious driller will normally "spud" identified wells within a ninety day period. Pauley
emphasized that Pike proceeded with the drilling in a businesslike
manner and completed the same by March 13, a seventy-three day
period from calendar year end. And, that was completion, not
spudding. Thus, a ninety day period for spudding seems quite
reasonable.
The only anticipated taxpayer quibble here would emanate from
northern climes. It is impossible to spud a well when the well site
area is covered with ice. Good intentions and expeditiousness cannot overcome the obstacles. To this limited extent the ninety day
rule seems arbitrary. Not all operators drill in Texas or New Mexico. Proceeding with "due deliberate speed" would seem to have
been a more realistic rule and one which would have been consistent with Pauley. This aspect of DRA, however, is digestible.
We now turn back to the "cash basis" limitation. DRA says that
the ninety day rule only applies to the extent of the taxpayers'
"cash" basis investment, i.e., straight cash prepayment. An investor's "cash basis" is the same as his "adjusted basis" (the normal
basis), except that the following cannot be included in the limited
partner's basis: (a) any portion of a partnership liability or (b) any
amount borrowed by the partner with respect to the partnership
which (i) was arranged by the partnership or by any person who
participated in the organization, sale, or management of the partnership (or any person related to such person within the meaning
of section 168(e)(4)) or (ii) was secured by any assets of the
partnership.
What does this mean? In general, it means that if a limited partner finances a portion of his investment in addition to contributing
cash and these financed amounts are in any way "arranged by" the
partnership, as described above, a prepayment will only be deductible in the year of his contribution to the extent of his cash investment. His basis will not be increased by the amount of his notes.
There are a number of problems with this DRA modification.
First, it seems to have no ground in pre-DRA law. It is therefore
difficult to understand and interpret. Second, since the ninety day
rule is thrown out altogether here, it can only be inferred that the
"spudding" rule is also thrown out on financed programs. Presumably, if all the wells in a financed program are spudded by December 31, the investor's deduction will still be limited to his cash basis even though the program is closed in August. The wells must
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actually be completed by December 31 in order for the investor to
take his full deduction in that calendar year.
Third, there will be an immense problem in determining whether
investor financing is "arranged by" within the meaning of the statute. Suppose, for example, an investor has invested many times in
a particular promoter's leveraged deals and that the promoter has
consistently used the same bank for his financing. It is logical to
suppose that the investor would go to that same bank to secure
funds for an investment with the same promoter in a non-leveraged deal.
In civil tax actions the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. If the
taxpayer's prepayment is disallowed on the basis that his financing
was "arranged by" the partnership, what does the taxpayer do?
The circumstantial evidence indicates that the financing was arranged by the partnership because of the course of prior dealings.
The taxpayer, it would seem, would have to get the bank's officer
and the general partner to testify in open court that the financing
was not "arranged by" the general partner. The court might well
choose to disbelieve both. The author can think of no way to circumvent this dilemma by due diligence.
There is, however, an interesting, adventitious twist to DRA's
provisions on financed programs. In the fall of 1983 the IRS ruled
in Private Letter Ruling 8404012 that leveraged oil and gas deals
were bad and that a limited partner's tax basis was, at least by
implication, in all events restricted to his cash investment. This
Letter Ruling has caused considerable consternation in the
industry.
The conference report on section 461(i) seems to eschew the
view expressed in the Letter Ruling:
To the extent that oil and gas prepayments do not meet the requirements
of the 90-day exception, they are subject to the general principle provided
in new section 461(h); thus, economic performance will occur as the drilling
services are provided to the taxpayer. If drilling is commenced in the year of
prepayment, only that portion of the intangible drilling costs attributable to
drilling prior to the end of the year will be deductible in that year. Such
portion of the costs will be deductible without regard to cash investment
37
limitation.

We noted at the outset of our DRA discussion that new section
461(i) introduces a special definition of tax shelter. For purposes of
subsection (i) of section 461, the term tax shelter means (A) any
37.

130

CONG.

REC. H6609 (daily ed. June 22, 1984) (emphasis added).
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enterprise (other than a C corporation) if at any time interests in
such enterprise have been offered for sale in any offering required
to be registered with any federal or state agency having the authority to regulate the offering of securities for sale, (B) any syndicate
(within the meaning of section 1256(e)(3)(B)), and (C) any tax
shelter (within the meaning of section 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii)). 38
It could be contended that an offering which is exempt from registration under state securities law (there are many such offerings) is not a "tax shelter" under section 461(i)(3)(A). This would
not be helpful, however, because the referenced definition of a syndicate is "any partnership or other entity (other than a corporation
which is not an S corporation) if more than 35 percent of the losses
of such entity during the taxable year are allocable to limited partners or limited entrepreneurs .... 31
Finally, the reference to "tax shelter" as that term is defined in
section 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii) is puzzling. That section refers to entities,
etc., wherein the principal purpose is the "avoidance or evasion of
Federal income tax." Under existing law any organization satisfying this definition is not entitled to any deductions anyway. Such
40
recent cases as Surloff v. Commissioner,
Brannen v. Commis442
42
sioner, Flowers v. Commissioner, and Burpee v. Commissioner,43 make this very clear. Can taxpayers now argue that even
though they have invested in a completely bogus program, they
still get the benefit of section 461(i)? This has not been thought
through by Congress.
Where does all this end up?
The conference report does not clarify current law, but rather
confuses it. By a simple reference to Keller, intent could have been
made crystal clear. The ninety day "spudding" rule should be relatively innocuous, but it seems completely unnecessary in most
cases and may prove draconian in others. The new provisions on
financed programs serve mainly to complicate the practitioner's
life. No rationale for the restrictions is promulgated. The reasoning, if any, behind the "tax shelter" classification is not set forth.
Why are certain corporations exempted?
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

I.R.C. § 461(i)(3).
I.R.C. § 1256(e)(3)(B).
81 T.C. 210 (1983).
78 T.C. 471 (1982).
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CONCLUSION

The answer to the simple question posed in this article, to the
extent that there is an answer, remains equivocal. DRA did not
help. DRA just amplified the complexities.
The changes enacted in DRA, insofar as they relate to the prepayment of IDC in oil and gas programs, certainly will not have
any momentous impact on the traditional commercial practices of
the industry. These changes are not matters of great pitch and moment from the standpoint of "substance"; yet they do require additional lawyer and accountant analysis, more communication time
with both the general and limited partners, and further qualifications, limitations, reservations, etc. in the offering documents.
If there is a social utility here, the author fails to perceive it. We
seem to engaged in a mindless pursuit of the hyper-technical.
Neither the IRS, the oil and gas promoters, nor the investor garner
any apparent benefit from this endless profusion of the abstruse.
The author profoundly hopes that such futile complexity will
shortly cease, that simple questions will have simple answers, and
that our society will thereby achieve compensatory time to devote
to more important goals.

